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Establishing a Total Safety Culture 
ESTABLISHING A TOTAL SAFETY CULTURE 
MTHINA FLIGHTDEPARTMENT 
Willem J. Homan, William G. Rantz, and Blair R Balden 
This article will present behavior-based principles and procedures that can be successfully applied to change safety 
attitudes in a Flight Department. First, lirmtations and flaws of the human condition are discussed, and three basic ways 
employees can learn safe behavior are addressed. Next, Crew Resource Management is proposed as a tool to increase 
overall safety in Business Aviation. Safety is then reviewed in the context of the overall goals of the corporation and the 
cost of doing business. Senior Corporate management is identiiied as holding the key to the successful and safe operation 
of the corporate Flight Department. Finally, critical issues surrounding Corporate Culture and the ultimate goal of a Total 
Safety Culture are discussed. Recommendations are then made to increase the overall safety level of the Business 
Aviation environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Business Aviation has grown extensively over the past 20 
years, and the industry's safety record has improved along the 
way. In fact, NBAA (1998) data show that in 1997 companies 
operated more than 18,300 turbine-powered business aircraft 
worldwide, or three times as many aircraft as in 1978. 
Furthermore, the safety statistics of corporate Flight 
Departments is superior to that of air taxi operators, and 
comparable to that of major airlines. With an accident rate of 
.23 per 100,000 hours of operations and a fatality rate of 0.06 
per 100,000 hours of operations Business Aviation is indeed 
very safe (NBAA, 1998). This data campares with an accident 
rate of 4.2 and a fatality rate of .81 in 1983 (NBAA, 1994). 
The increased use of two-man flight crews, standardized 
recurrency training, and more sophisticated flight equipment 
has contributed sigdicantly to the enhancement of safety in 
the Business Aviation industry. Does this mean that all is 
well? Definitively not! 
With the increase in IraiEc that is expected in the foreseeable 
future, the only way to keep the accident rate down is to 
concentrate with a vengeance on safety standards. Until all 
planes retura safely to their home base, there will be room for 
improvement. The question is how do we achieve ultimate 
safety in an error-prone environment? The answer may lie in 
the prioritization of safety at all levels, making sure the 
concept permeates the entire organization fiom the 
Boardroom to the Flight Department and from the 
maintenance hangar to the cockpit. This daunting task is 
complex and, contrary to popular belief, not easily 
accomplished. We will fnst look at safety at the personal level 
and follow up with a more organizational approach to 
achieving ultimate safety. Challenges in the areas of personal 
psychology and Corporate Culture wiU be addressed, along 
with recommendations to assist Senior Corporate 
Management in reaching the target of zero accidents at the 
Flight Department level. 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND SAFETY 
Most of us like to think of safety as a type of behavior that 
comes natural to us. Actually, the opposite is true. It is often 
more common and convenient for people to take risks. Since 
accidents tend to occur infrequently, it is not surprising that 
march indicates a natural human tendency for employees to 
rely on quick and easy shortcuts to accomplish tasks in the 
workplace. Also, taking chances and living-on-the-edge is fun 
and exhilaratmg, while pursuing safe behavior can be dull and 
boring. This is true both on and off the job. Thus, at the 
individual level, we fight a constant battle between human 
nature and common sense. Defensive strategies have been 
developed to help employees cope with this urge to take 
chances and do things their own way instead of using safety- 
centered standard operating procedures. More on-the-job 
training comes to mind. Reducing peer pressure to take risks 
is another. This is particularly true for the pilot profession 
where demands by pilots "pushing the envelope" can coerce 
a cautious colleague into taking risks (Transport Canada, 
1996). In the end, an organizational approach is required to 
make safety a way of life in the worblace. 
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THE BEHAVIOR-BASED SAFETY APPROACH 
The behavior-based approach to safety focuses on the 
observable actions of employees and the organizational setting 
that influence these actions. This safety theory seems quite 
suitable since 80% of all aviation related accidents result fiom 
human error. The method focuses on both personal on-the-job 
behaviors as well as on the orgauizational setting that supports 
these behaviors. No initial blame is assigned and errors are 
viewed in the context of a comprehensive analysis (Geller, 
1996). This is very different from the more traditional way of 
handling safety mishaps where investigations by corporate 
management resulted in assigning blame f?om the start to 
employees or conditions. The behavior-based safety approach 
is proactive and preventive in nature. It is a process of 
iden-g problems and gathering and analpng data to 
improve conditions in the workplace. Removing barriers to 
communication and providing feedback is critical in this 
process. Ultimately7 the goal is to establish a continued level 
of awareness, leading to a total safety culture that will 
permeate the organization. 
IMPROVING PERSONAL SAFETY ATTITUDES 
Jensen (1989) identified five hazardous attitudes that can 
jeopardize safety in any aviation environment. Anti-authority 
or an attitude of "don't tell me!" is found in people who don't 
like anyone telling them what to do. Clearly, this attitude can 
affect aviation safety. Impulsivity, or the "do something 
quickly" attitude, is the thought pattern of people who 
frequently feel the need to do something, anydung, 
immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are 
about to do and feel that it is too late to locate the checklist or 
repair manual to do the task in a safe and structured fashion. 
They do the &st thing that comes to mind. Invulnerability, or 
the "it won't happen to me7' attitude, shows up in people who 
feel that accidents happen to others but never to them. Pilots 
or Flight Department technicians who think this way are more 
likely to take chances and may jeopardize safety for the entire 
operation. Then there is the Macho attitude, which is 
exhibited by those who ate always trying to prove that they are 
better than anyone else. They take risks to "prove7' themselves 
and impress their coworkers. Fmdly, there is the attitude of 
Resignation, where employees don't see themselves as 
making a great deal of Merence. They are along for the ride. 
Eventually, my of these dangerous attitudes will result in poor 
and unsafe performance. 
Awareness of the five dangerous attitudes is the fist step in 
eljmiuating them fiom our human judgment. Thoughts similar 
to the ones deskbed above are actually common and normal. 
When we are able to identlfy these thoughts and feelings, we 
can then focus on counteracting them. First, learning to 
examine our own thinking and control our own behavior is 
critical in this process. Second, it is important that human 
performance limitations are identified and that everyone 
accepts the fact that human errors will occur. As long as we 
are dealing with humans, there is simply no perfection. 
Change does not come easily and constant striving is required. 
For example, attitudes of invulnerability are often dBcult to 
eradicate in aviation personnel even after extensive crew 
training (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). On the hangar floor, 
similar attitudes may prevail when it becomes tedious and 
inconvenient to follow elaborate safety rules. Nevertheless, 
the acceptance and awareness of our human condition will go 
a long way in addressmg serious mistakes before they become 
catastrophic. 
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) has traditionally been 
defined as the effective use of all available resources. The 
concept was designed to reduce human factor-related 
accidents and to improve the human-machine interface by 
enhancing teamwork, decision making, and situational 
awareness on the flight deck (Cooper, White & Lauber, 
1980). Over the years the evohring field of CRM has widened 
its focus fiom flight crews to cabin crews to maintenance 
technicians. CRM cmently includes specialized training for 
most types of aviation personnel. From dispatchers (Dispatch 
Resource Management) (FAA, 1995) to maintenance 
personnel (Maintenance Resource Management) (FAA, 
1997), CRM has been introdwed just about everywhere in the 
organization. Along the way, CRM lrahing became 
synonymous with the creation of a more friendly work 
emironmat The main objective of reducing potentially fatal 
ermrs was often overlooked. Recently, aviation psychologists 
redehed CRM as a critical form of Emor Management. This 
perspective presupposes that human errors are inevitable, but 
as long as the resulting situation is managed properly, safety 
can be maintained. Helmreich (1 996) identified three ways to 
control and minimize human errors. First, there is the total 
avoidance of error through proper training. Next, the trapping 
of errors or eliminating the mistakes is identified. Finally, 
there is the mitigation of errors or controlling the 
consequences of the errors that have been made. Clearly, this 
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three-step process of risk management is an excellent 
approach to acheve ultimate safety. The increased perception 
and the associated attitudinal changes should be part of that 
process. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRM 
There is a general assumption among safety experts that 
incidents and accidents in the workplace are primarily a result 
of questionable decision making by high-level managers 
(McSween, 1995). The main goal of senior management is to 
produce a product or provide a service and do so in the most 
profitable way possible to increase the wealth of the 
shareholders. Management also has the obligation to do this 
with the highest degree of safety. There may be 
circumstances, though, where, at least in the short term, a 
conflict of interest exists between production and safety. 
Reason (1 990) identified two perceptional factors that show 
why th~s  occurs: 
1. Certainty of outcome: Resources directed at 
improving production (service) have certain outcomes. Those 
aimed at enhancing safety do not. 
2. Nature of feedback: Feedback generated by the 
pursuit of production (senice) is rapid, clear, and compelling. 
That which is associated with the pursuit of safety is largely 
negative, intermittent, and only compelling after a major 
accident or string of incidents. 
As a result, management often focuses on production 
(or service), assuming that safety will take care of itself. The 
fact that very few unsafe acts actually result in damage or 
injury supports this line of thinking. What follows is that in 
h&ly safeguarded work environments, like aircraft cockpits 
or aviation maintenance hangars, complacency may set in 
among the employees. In cases like these, it would actually 
take an unusual chain of events for a situation to develop into 
something disas@ous. This is often referred to as the error- 
chain (Reason, 1990). For example, one of the most common 
accident scenarios involves the deliberate disabling of 
engineered safety features by operators in pursuit of what, at 
the time, seems a perfectly sensible goal (disengaging an auto- 
pilot to expedite an approach). On other occasions, safety is 
compromised because the operators have an erroneous 
perception of the situation. With pilots, this may lead to 
situaiional awareness problems. In the case of mechanics, the 
result may be the installation of the wrong aircraft part. This 
makes the pursuit of safety in any organization a continuous 
challenge. 
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY 
It is easy for safety experts to blame senior level 
management for problems with safety. Why does this occur? 
Why is there often the perceived lack of safety awareness on 
the part of management? The answer may lie in the way 
managers are educated and trained (Erickson, 1997). Senior 
managers tend to be graduates of business schools where 
programs focus on Finance, Marketing, Operations, and 
Production. In these programs, little, if any, attention is given 
to the management of safety. Furthermore, MBAs at major 
firms receive corporate training only about the companies' 
product-line and services. How to conduct business in a safe 
and secure fashion is only incidental to their business 
aclivitiies. Moreover, management often perceives safety as a 
cost to doing business, a cost that interferes with the short- 
term goals of the company. ILI the end, the safety management 
task is left to the Safety Ofticer. This person is often the only 
one in the firm with any formal training in the field of safety. 
Depending on his or her authority level within the 
organizaton, safety issues and suggestions may or may not be 
taken seriously. Finally, even when companies have high- 
ranking safety officials, how well do they understand the 
specific issues m u n d i n g  aviation safety? As a result, these 
barriers and issues concerning safety in the aviation 
department often result in only limited acceptance and 
participation by corporate managers. 
CORPORATE AVIATION SAFETY 
In a recent editorial, John W. Olcott (1997), President of the 
National Business Aircraft Association, stated that Business 
aviation offers the opportmity to be the safest form of 
transportation for company personnel, with no exceptions. 
Only business aviation allows a company to control all the 
factors affecting travel safety, such as pilot and mechanic 
hiring, operating procedures, equipment selection, 
maintenance, scheduling, dispatch, enroute diversion, and 
most certainly training. @. 1) 
This statement implies that senior management holds the key 
to the successll operation of its Flight Department, and when 
it comes to aviation safety, management is in control of its 
own destiny. Clearly, the potential for ultimate safety exists, 
but what about the reality? What is happening at major 
mporatim that can jeopardize the safety of business flying? 
The answer lies hidden inside of the same corporations that so 
treasure their Flight Departments. It has to do wi t .  the nature 
of the corporate enterprise, economic survival of the fittest, 
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and increasing the shareholders' wealth. Actually, it has a lot 
to do with financial gain and very little with aviation. It is 
about Corporate Culture and how modern enterprises operate 
in the corporate jungle. 
CORPORATE CULTURE 
For most of us, the term Corporate Culture hints at an 
elusive concept to be understood only by organizational 
behaviorists. When we rephrase this term to "the way we do 
things around here," then it makes sense. It is basically about 
social behavior in the workplace. Merritt and Helmreich 
(1996) identified two important and distinct components of 
Corporate Culture. On the surface there are the recognizable 
visible elements of behavior, such as dress codes and layout 
of o& space. Then there is the deeper structure, consisting 
of the values and beliefs that control the personal behavior of 
the workForce. 
Within the corporate structure, management assumptions 
fonn the foundation of its culture. These assumptions reveal 
management's values or standads about how they do business 
and how they expect their employees to conduct themselves. 
Through management actions, Corporate Culture has a direct 
influence on the work environment. Furthermore, a f m  
maintains its values and beliefs by rewarding the employees 
who comply. Behavioral science tells us that actions that are 
rewarded wiU be repeated, as they are rewarded and repeated, 
they become unconscious. At this point rewarded behavior 
becomes part of the Corporate Culture (Erickson, 1997). 
Corporate Cultures are Wcu l t  to change, and modifying 
them is a real challenge. A crisis is often necessary to produce 
major change m the behavior of employees. Mergers and buy- 
outs tend to have that effect, because they rock the foundation 
of the enterprise and affect everybody. More subtle changes 
in Corporate Culture can also be achieved by bringing in a 
new CEO or senior management team, but here changes in 
employee behavior wil l  be more gradual and less noticeable. 
In the end, it's the employees' perception of management's 
values and actions that shapes Corporate Culture. Change can 
come only through employees adjusting their attitudes and 
beliefs about the company. 
DEF'INlNG SAFETY CULTURE 
Meshkati (1997) describes a Safety Culture as a system 
composed of behaviors, practices, policies, and stmctural 
components that emphasize Safety in an organization. The 
two general components of Safety Culture are "the necessary 
b e w o r k  within an organization and the attitude of the staff 
at all Herent levels in respondmg to and benefiting fiom the 
fr-amework." For a Safety Culture to be effective it is therefore 
essential for employees to have a questioning attitude and to 
be able to discuss Safety issues fieely with other members of 
the organization. Within any company the organizational 
culture determines the perception of safety, the relative 
importance placed on safety, and the members' activities 
regarding safety (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). Implementing 
a Safety Culture is a lengthy process, but senior management 
can take important steps to successfully achieve this goal. The 
process includes highly visible internal activities promoting 
the safety concept throughout the company and requires 
continuous commitment by senior management. It's a 
proactive process and there should be no exceptions. 
Otherwise, employee trust is violated. The key elements in 
establishing a Safety Culture include appointing safety officers 
to oversee specific operations, galbering and analyzing data on 
safety issues, mandating training to reinforce safety behavior, 
and establishing a non-threatening system for incident 
reporting. Also, open communication and feedback between 
personnel and management is critical to this proactive 
process. Furthermore, organizational practices determine the 
attitudes and trust that individuals have in working for an 
organization. These attitudes toward senior management 
undoubtedly have an intluence upon the way employees 
perceive the importance the organization places on safety. In 
the end, only when the perceptions of corporate management 
match the perceptions of the workforce can the employees 
commit to the new way of "doing things" and a Safety Culture 
be established. 
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS 
While the majorlry of the employees in an organization know 
the proper channels for communicating safety concerns, few 
actually report every safety issue, and even fewer believe that 
their safety suggestions will be acted upon (Geller, 1996). As 
for the Flight Departments: there is a long tradition in aviation 
that aslung for other people's opinions and reporting personal 
mishaps are signs of weakness (Transport Canada, 1996). 
Clearly, if there is no communication, no follow-through or 
feedback, the Safety Culture suffers. Zf, on the other hand, the 
organizational culture is strong and positive, pilots and other 
groups will more openly discuss safety problems, and they 
will be more willing to participate in associated training. 
Employees can sense senior or departmental management's 
philosophy toward safety through its actions and behavior. A 
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whole set of indicators can show commitment to safety or lack 
thereof. For example, are safety concerns addressed during 
meetings, or is it just an assumed practice? How does the 
leadership respond to incidents and accidents? Are mishaps 
addressed or just swept under the rug? Are victims blamed, or 
does senior management investigate for possible corporate 
responsibilities? These are some of the questions that will 
shape the corporate Safety Culture at a firm. Unfortunately, it 
often takes a major incident or accident for an organization to 
review its safety policies and procedures. 
MERGERS AND CULTURE SHOCK 
The most spectacular growth in a company's total assets 
occurs when a merger takes place. The primary motivation for 
caporate mergers is to increase the economic performance of 
the combined business entities. Iftwo companies merge and 
the combined value exceeds that of each individual h, then 
synergy is said to exist, and such a merger supposedly benefits 
all shareholders. Whether these mergers strengthen or weaken 
a f m  is often debated (Freivalds, 1998). Merging Werent 
Corporate Cultures through reorganization has generally been 
very costly for companies. Unless there is a high level of 
compatibility, the process will result in Corporate Culture 
shock. 
JOINT FLIGHT DEPARTMENTS 
Many corporations currently co-own Flight Departments to 
reduce traqmtation expenses. Although consolidation of the 
transportation divisions may make perfect economic sense, 
shared operations come at a price. Integrating the different 
Corporate Cultures at the Flight Department level can be a 
challenge, especially when the separate companies used to 
operate their own fleet of airplanes. Although the goals and 
problems associated with the operation of a corporate aviation 
department are pretty unique, Flight Departments tend to 
adopt the culture of the larger corporate structure in which 
they operate. As a result, the behavior of the aviation 
employees is greatly influenced by the practices, policies, and 
procedures of the overall organization. In fact, pilots fkom 
separate corporations may be flying together without really 
knowing or understanding the Werences in flight operations 
procedures. This crew pairing can create confusion in the 
cockpit and set the stage for a potential incident or accident 
(Carley, 1998). The dispatch policies of corporation 'X' may 
be difTerent fkom those of corporation "Y," leaving it up to a 
distraught dispatcher to figure out if he or she can release an 
airplane or not. Even worse, imagine maintenance personnel 
h m  the different companies trying to settle a dspute on how 
to best maintain the joint fleet. What makes these scenarios a 
threat to safety is that when people lose track of their social 
identity or 3he way we do things around here," they also 
become more agitated. Stress levels increase and confusion 
sets in. Eventually, this may lead to impaired judgments and 
other high-risk human factor problems. Most Flight 
Departments operate under Part 9 1 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations. This regulatory structure leaves a lot of room for 
personalized operations and judgments. As a result, the 
escalating trend toward mergers, acquisitions, and alliances 
may indeed become a real threat to the safety of Business 
Aviation. 
DESIGNING THE TOTAL SAFETY CULTURE 
According to Erickson (1997), the successful 
implementation of a Total Safety Culture in an organization 
requires attention to three critical factors: Management 
Support, Management Concern and Positive Employee 
Setting. 
In the area of Management Support, we can identify seven 
important elements that can make or break the 
implementation of a Safety Culture: 
1. Written Philosophy: A good indicator that 
management is serious about safety performance is when a 
safety statement is included in the mission statement of the 
company. However, if management does not actively support 
this written philosophy, then Flight Department employees 
will not believe that management is sincere about safety, and 
the Safety Culture may be adversely affected. 
2. WorkEnvimnment: When the Flight Department 
is designed with safety in mind, such as extra safety features 
an the airplanes and a sparkling clean hangar, employees tend 
to operate the eqqment in a safe manner. This has a positive 
effect on the perception of how important safety is to 
management. 
3. Safety OfJicial Status: When the Safety O%icer 
holds an executive position within the company, this gives a 
clear indication that safety has a high priority. The level of 
familiarity the Safety Officer has with the operations at the 
Flight Department is also important. 
4. Priority of Safeg Di.scussions: When safety issues 
take a backstage to other functions in the company and 
meetings about safety are canceled on a regular basis, safety 
is devalued. On the other hand, if attendance of safety 
briefings is mandatory and executive presence is common; 
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5.  Integration of Safeety: Senior management that is 
serious about safety will make sure that safety awareness is 
present throughout the company. Integration of safety policies 
into the strategic planning of the company is critical to the 
successful implementation of a Safety Culture. High safety 
perfbrmance occurs when employees feel that safety is on an 
equal footing with other concerns of the company. If the Flight 
Department employees realize that senior management will 
ovenide them on important issues like crew duty times and 
aircraft maintenance expenses, this will be perceived as "we 
are just the Fhght DepartmenP' who is expected to "salute and 
execute." Clearly, this will negatively affect the Total Safety 
Culture. 
6. Safety Training: When safety training is accepted 
as an ongoing process rather than a one-time event, the 
positive effects on the Safety Culture will be signifcant. On 
the other hand, when Flight Department employees receive 
safety orientation only during their first few weeks on the job, 
the effects may not be as clear. Corporations that encourage 
their employees to attend seminars to improve their individual 
performance tend to have a better safety recard. A Flight 
Department that receives financial support for educational 
activities will be a safer department. 
7. Peflonnance Appraisals: Including an 
employee's safety record in annual performance reviews 
demonstrates mauagement's commitment to safety. However, 
the informatian should not be used to blame the employee for 
incidents or mishaps and should serve only as an awareness 
tool to improve the system. 
In the area of Management Concern, there are four elements 
that can enhance the implementation of a Safety Culture: 
1. Safety Knowledge: Does management understand 
what aviation safety is about? Did it have any formal training 
in how to manage safety? If management feels that aviation 
safety is only incidental to the mission of the company and 
that it amtilutes a cost rather than a benefit, the effect on the 
Safety Culture will be negative. However, if management 
udemkmds the basic safety issues that involve the company's 
Flight Department the effects will be positive and will 
enhance the perception of a Safety Culture among the 
employees. 
2. Corporate Model: I f  senior management operates 
the company using an autocratic style and treats employees as 
just a means to increase production, the Safety Culture will 
fllffer. However, if management realizes that safety concerns 
in the Fhght Department may closely affect other functions in 
the company, then the Safety Culture will be improved. Here, 
a more democratic management style may be more effective. 
3. Resources: Allocation of resources to enhance 
safety in the company and the Flight Department in particular 
is a clear indication of the importance that senior management 
places on safety. When the Flight Department needs more 
people in order to maintain safety standards and senior 
management denies the request based on lack of resources, the 
employees' perception of the Safety Culture will be negatively 
affected. Furthermore, if requests for additional aviation 
personnel are rejected while other departments receive extra 
manpower, the morale at the Flight Department will be 
severely damaged. 
4. Injuy Causation: Safety performance is lowered 
when management blames employees for every incident or 
aacident that occurs in the Flight Department. Assuming that 
it is always the employee's fault when something goes wrong 
will negatively affect the overall Safety Culture. Blaming 
people also results in defensive behaviors and will result in 
poor incident reporting. Conversely, when employees are not 
blamed and the safety problems are looked at objectively, all 
causal factors can be identified and preventive measures 
instituted. 
The area of Positive Employee Setting refers to the manner 
in which management treats employee responses. The 
following seven conditions wi l l  have an important effect on 
establishing and maintaining a positive Safety Culture. 
1. WorkEnvironment: Management's promotion of 
a clean, secure work environment at the Flight Department 
will have a positive influence on the job-related behavior of 
the employees. Such an environment is an indication of 
management's concern for the department and will enhance 
the perception of a Safety Culture. 
2. Management Actions: Here, too, actions speak 
louder than words. When management goes out of its way to 
address safety problems, employees take notice. Also, when 
management solicits advice &om the Flight Department on 
safety-related issues, safety performance increases. Giving 
employees some control over their work environment has a 
positive effect on the Safety Culture. 
3. Communication and Feedback: Clear and open 
communication is very important to safety in the workplace. 
The key is honest communication fiom top management. If 
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words are not followed by appropriate actions, an atmosphere 
of distrust may develop. When senior management provides 
positive feedback in response to suggestions and new ideas 
h m  the Flight Department, the employees will have a better 
attitude toward their job and will sense that they have control 
over their own destiny. This will create a feeling of being part 
of the organization and will result in the enhancement of the 
Safety Culture. Conversely, if management does not 
encourage or acknowledge suggestions and new ideas, 
employees will develop an attitude of "they don't listen to us 
anyway" and will feel no commitment to the company. 
Clearly, this would a.Bect the overall Safety Culture of the 
organization. 
4. Treatment of Employees: When the Flight 
Department employees are treated with respect and are taken 
seriously when raising a safety issue, they react in a positive 
way that will enhance the overall Safety Culture. If, on the 
other hand, management ignores employee input, alienation 
and apathy will set in and the Safety Culture will be negatively 
affected. Awarding creative thinking is a characteristic of 
excellent companies. A Corporate Culture that encourages 
employee suggestions creates trust among its work€orce. 
When a Flight Department employee proposes an innovative 
way to solve a dispatch problem and is complimented for the 
suggestion, this action will stimulate an attitude of ownership 
on the part of the employee and enhance the overall Safety 
Culture of the company. 
5 .  Employee Commitment: A democratic 
management style that involves cooperation and respect will 
result in employees caring about their workplace. The 
hierarchical approach associated with the more autocratic 
style of management tends to result in alienation and an 
attitude of "we just work here." This will negatively affect 
employee morale, and when morale is low in the Flight 
Department, unsafe behavior will become more prevalent. 
Conversely, when morale is hi& synergy wilI develop, which 
wiU positively affect the Safety Culture. 
6. Organizational Compatibility: When the 
Transportation Division or Flight Department does not seem 
to fit within the overall company structure and operates as a 
complete separate entity, a subculture will develop with its 
own norms and values. If these philosophical differences 
between the divisions and the corporate headquarters are 
taken to an extreme, countercultures may develop that will set 
their own rules. This will have a negative effect on the Safety 
Culture. 
7. Ethics: Neglecting moral questions is not good for 
business. Clearly, management's value system will have an 
effect on the way employees perceive the Corporate Culture. 
These values include trust and a sense of right and wrong 
concerning the welfare of others. If the company expresses 
ethical concern for employees and goes beyond the strictly 
legal commitment, this will have a positive effect on the 
Safety Culture, creating an atmosphere of "management cares 
about us." 
The Erickson (1997) study revealed that the key elements 
associated with establishing an effective Total Safety Culture 
were found in the area of Positive Employee Setting. The 
seven elements (Work Environment, Management Actions, 
Communication and Feedback, Treatment of Employees, 
Employee Commitment, Organizational Compatibility, and 
Ethics) were identified as most predictive of safety 
performance. Obviously, if management cares about the 
Flight Department employees and shows respect, these 
attitudes and fet:lings will cross over and employees will start 
to care about management and the bottom line. However, only 
in democratic, horizontally structured corporations will this 
change be successll. The more hierarchical corporations will 
require a more fundamental change before the focus can shift 
to implementing a Total Safety Culture. Finally, to establish 
a Total Safety Culture that permeates and encompasses both 
the overall corporation and its Flight Department, senior 
management has to formalize its intend by establishing a 
safety culture framework within the organization. The design 
of this framework should be company specific but guided by 
the f111dings of the Erickson (1997) research. Clearly, the 
attitude of the employees will be greatly influenced by the 
rules and uncmkdy avoidance of the overall organization, as 
well as the openness of the organizational culture (Meshkati, 
1997). 
CONCLUSIONS 
A comprehensive approach to safety is required to achieve 
a Total Safety Culture. Both personal and organizational 
commitments are needed for success. As individuals, we must 
realize the limitations and flaws of the human condition. 
However, a behavior-based approach may assist us in 
determinjng what went wrong and how to avoid incidents and 
accidents in the future. Also, awareness of the five dangerous 
attitudes will help us control our urge to take chances or fall 
into typical behavioral traps. Finally, implementing Crew 
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Resource Management through advanced teamwork and 
proper communication will enhance our ability to control 
errors in the Flight Department. 
On an organizational level, we have to be aware of the 
constantly changing corporate climate. Current business 
trends like mergers and acquisitions may result in Corporate 
Culture clashes that will create very confusing and often 
dangerous workplace conditions. To counter this and other 
potential threats to safety, corporations should strive for the 
highest level of protection: a fully integrated safety program 
that is part of the overall philosophy of the company and one 
that values the concerns and inputs of all employees. Such a 
program would then form the basis for the creation of a Total 
Safety Culture within the company. Building on this 
foundation senior management should then address the key 
elements in establishing a Safety Culture by appointing a 
Safety Oiiicer. This individual's tasks will be to gather data 
on safety issues, to develop training to reinforce safety 
behavior, and to establish a non-threatening system for 
incident reporting. Moreover, to be effective, the Safety 
Officer should concentrate on the area of Positive Employee 
Setting identified in the Erickson (1997) research. Clearly, 
open channels of communication between personnel and the 
Safety Oflicer will be critical in this process. In the end, 
contml of safe operations in an organizational slructure like a 
Flight Department is a continuous process that requires both 
personal and organizational commitment, well-dehed 
feedback, and teamwork.0 
Wiem J. Homen holds a Doctorate in Leadership fkom Northern Arizona State University and an MBA fkom Arizona State 
University. He also completed a Master's in Aeronautical Technology at Southeastern Oklahoma State University and is a 
l i d  pilot (ATP) and flight instructor. Dr. Homan is an Associate Professor in the School of Aviation Sciences at Western 
Michigan University. 
Blair R Balden earned a Master of Arts degree in Technology Education fkom West Virginia University. He holds an FAA 
A&P certificate with Inspector Authorization and specializes in Avionics. He is an Assistant Professor in the School of Aviation 
Sciences at Western Michigan University. 
William G. Rantz earned a Master of Arts degree in Career and Technical Education from Western Michigan University. He 
holds both FAA ATP and CFII certificates and specializes in computer based training. He is an Assistant Professor in the School 
of Aviation Sciences at Western Michigan University. 
42 JAAER, Winter 1998 
8
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1998], Art. 3
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol8/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1998.1228
Establishing a Tozal Safeety Culture 
REFERENCES 
Carley, W. M. (1998, March 20). Cockpit confusion. Wall Street Journal, p. 8. 
Cooper, G.E., White, M.D., Lauber, J.K. (1980). Resource Management on the Flightdeck: Proceedings ofa 
NASAhdustrv Workshop. (NASA CP-2 120). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center. 
Erickson, J. A. (1997). The relationship between corporate culture and safety perfomance. Professional Safety. 42(5), 
29-33. 
Federal Aviation Admiuistration (1 995). Dispatch Resource Management Training, (AC 12 1-32). Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Federal Aviation Administration (1997). Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance lnsvection (AFS-300 /AAM- 
240). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oljice. 
Freivalds, J. (1998, October). When Cultures Clash. Communication World. 15.19-21. 
Geller, E. S. (1996). The psvcholoey of safety. Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Company. 
Helmreich, RL. (1996). The Evolution of Crew Resource Management. Paper presented at the IATA Human Factors 
Seminar, Warsaw, Poland. 
Jensen, R S. (1 989). Aeronautical Decision Making-Cock~it Resource Management. The Ohio State University 
Research Foundation, Columbus, Ohio. 
McSween, T.E. (1995). values-based Safetv Process. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Merritt, A. C., & Helmreich, R. L. (1996). Creating and sustaining a safety culture. Q&? Advocate, L 8-12. 
Meshkati, N. (1 997). Human Performance. Organizational Factors and Safety Culture. Paper presented at the NTSB 
Symposium on Corporate Culture and Transportation Safety. Washington, DC. 
National Business Aviation Association (1998). Business Aviation Fact Book Washington, DC: NBAA publications. 
National Business Aviation Association (1994). Business Aviation Fact Book, Washington, DC: NBAA publications. 
Olcott, J. W. (1997). Measuring safety. Business Aviation Safety Journal, 12. 1. 
Reason, J. (1 990). Human error. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Transport Canada (1 996). Human Factors for Aviation. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
43 JAAER Winter 1998 
9
Homan et al.: Establishing a Total Safety Culture within a Flight Department
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1998
